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State control of the issuance of securities of public service
corporations has developed by rather slow stages from an al-
most complete absence of control during the era of special
charters to concentration of power in the hands of a commission.
The present state laws dealing with the control of public utility
capitalization consist of a few special charter acts, general stat-
utes, and special public utility acts. Since the last type of law
represents the most complete method of control, an analysis
will be made of this group.
Control vested in special franchise acts or in general statutes
invariably proves to be inadequate to properly control capitaliza-
tion. Legislative control resulting from special charter acts
usually fails to adequately safeguard the rights of the investor.
Legislatures are not equipped for the task of proper security
regulation.' Few legislators possess the specialized knowledge
and experience necessary to control such financial matters
through the granting of special charters by legislative enact-
ment. Sound financial regulation also requires a non-partisan
weighing of the facts in the case and a willingness to come to
whatever conclusion the facts warrant. Too often legislative
action is determined on the basis of certain promises made prior
to election, and is not the result of evidence submitted in a speci-
fic case. Due also to an overcrowded legislative program, im-
portant legislation may be enacted during the closing days of a
session with little or no consideration.2
Courts as a reliance in regulation have likewise their short-
comings. It is quite possible to pass general statutes that set
up requirements such as are contained in typical modern public
utility acts, and leave them to the courts for enforcement. Many
commonwealths have for a rather long period relied almost ex-
clusively on this kind of machinery; but now substantially all
the states have commissions which enforce the statute provisions
dealing with the utilities, and a considerable number of these
commissions have the power to regulate the issuance of securi-
ties.3 The shortcomings of the courts in this respect are only
relatively fewer than those of the legislatures. Frequently
' For further discussion, see White, The Origin of Utility Commis-ions in
Massachusetts (1921) 29 Joup. OF POLITICAL ECONOMiY 177-197.
2 Cf. CLARK, SOCIAL CONTROL oF BUSINEnSS (1926) 303.




the costs of suits before a court are prohibitive to those who
are most in need of protection. Court dockets may also be
crowded. This all gives rise to the need for a more specific
agency. Some body is needed which can render an expert opin-
ion without throwing upon the plaintiff the cost and delay of
court action with its expensive fees. It is sufficiently evident
that some different agency is needed wherever the problem of
regulation arises on a large scale involving numerous corpora-
tions, many cases requiring elaborate records,' and widespread
individual complaints not worth the cost of expensive litigation.
Needs of this character have brought into existence that out-
standing governmental innovation known as the regulating com-
mission. The commission is nominally an administrative body
charged with carrying into effect the law as passed by the legis-
lature. In practical effect, however, it combines legislative, exec-
utive, and judicial functions, and were it not for the fact that
the legislature can withdraw the power it has conferred, and
that the courts hold the ultimate right of judicial review, there
might be danger through the use of this sort of control of hav-
ing popular government replaced by bureaucracy.,
In eight states the commissions have been established by pro-
visions of the constitution, and their powers defined and am-
plified by statute; in the other states the commissions have been
created by legislative enactment. Delaware is the only state
having no commission. In the case of twenty-four states no
power has been conferred on the commissions to regulate the
issuance of securities.6 As Delaware has no commission, there
is thus a total of twenty-five states in which control of securities
is absent. In the remaining states the laws impose upon the
public service commissions the duty of regulating the issuance
of securities by utility corporations, 7 and provide "that the ap-
proval and consent of the commission shall be necessary before
any stocks, bonds, or evidences of indebtedness shall be issued." 8
All the commissions regulating securities except those of Massa-
chusetts and Texas have been established since 1907. In gen-
eral, the laws provide that the commissions shall approve only
4 CLARK, op. cit. supra note 2, at 304.
GIbid. 305.
6 Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Ien-
tucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
7 Arizona, California, District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, R~hode Island,
Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin.
8 Cf. Heilman, Development by Commissions of the Principles of Publio
Utility Capitalization (1915) 23 JouR. OF PoLrrIcAL EcONOMY 888.
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such issues of securities as are deemed reasonably necessary for
certain purposes. The laws of the respective states differ in
wording and detail, but apparently the principle common to all
is that securities shall be issued only in such amounts as shall
be necessary for purposes properly chargeable to capital account.
The commissions are necessarily entrusted with a large degree
of discretion, and have powers varying from publicity to ab-
solute control. The Pennsylvania and Virginia commissions are
of the pure publicity type. Their duties consist of the filing of
notices of increases of securities. Four commissions have un-
restricted control over security issues. These are the Vermont
commission, which derives its authority from a general statute
preventing over-capitalization, and the Arizona, California, and
Illinois commissions, which obtain their power from detailed
provisions in general public service commission acts. Ten of
the commissions are required to ascertain the truth of the state-
ments in the corporation's application for approval.0 The Texas
law is rather stringent. It is enforced rigidly by imposing
severe penalties upon a utility corporation for any infringement.
In nineteen states public utilities may issue securities only
upon previous permission of the commission evidenced by a cer-
tificate of authority. 10 Before such a certificate can be issued
an application by the corporation for approval is necessary. The
laws of several states contain only a very general clause, requir-
ing a written application," while others outline the contents of
the application, requiring items such as amount, character, pur-
pose of the issue, terms of issue, and the description and esti-
mated value of the property that is made the basis of the issues.2
Ordinarily, where an application is required for security issues
by utilities, the commission carries on an investigation.1 If,
after this investigation, the conunission decides to permit an
issue of securities, the certificate must, in several states, be re-
corded on the books of the company before securities may be
issued.-4 In some other states the certificate must be filed with
9 District of Columbia, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michi-
gan, Missouri, Nebraska, and New Jersey.
10 The following states have this requirement: Arizona, California, Dis-
trict of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Blaine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jer-
sey, New York, Ohio, Vermont, and Wisconsin. In Rhode Island such
authority is required for the stock issues of street railways only.
"- Georgia, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, and Ver-
mont.
12 Indiana, Kansas, Ohio, and Wisconsin.
3This is customary in Arizona, California, Georgia, Illinois, Blaine,
Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio,
Vermont, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania in case of a certificate of valuation.
14 District of Columbia, Kansas, Missouri, and Wisconsin.
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the Secretary of State.1" In this investigation the chief duty
of the commissions is to see to it that the proposed securities to
be issued are for legitimate purposes. Some states forbid the
utilities to apply the proceeds of the securities to purposes other
than those specified in the commission's certificate, 1 or in excess
of the amount there authorized.17 Most commissions having
control over capitalization inquire at the outset whether the issue
under consideration is for purposes which are in accord with
the nature of the business carried on by the particular utility
corporation. The commissions of Ohio and Vermont are author-
ized to reject applications if not convinced that the proceeds will
be spent for the general good of the public. The acts of Cali-
fornia, Arizona and Illinois permit the same interpretation. In
Wisconsin the commission is vested with the power to require
the utility to perform any act necessary to carry out the pro-
visions of the law. Certain states allow their commissions to
establish such rules and regulations as in their judgment are
reasonable and necessary to prevent the disposition of the pro-
ceeds for purposes other than those designated in the order.y8
The laws of some states also call for a detailed accounting of
the proceeds.9
Securities issued with the object of duplicating facilities are not
considered legitimate as to purpose by a number of the commis-
sions.20  This position is undoubtedly justified, since unnecessary
duplication of utility facilities results in reducing to scrap value
much of the property of one or both companies. In such cases
the burdens of the utility are increased and the public is not bene-
fited. Commissions wherever possible should prevent the issu-
ance of securities for unnecessary construction. The purposes
generally specified by statute for which securities may be issued
are the acquisition of property, the construction or extension of
facilities, the improvement or maintenance of service, the dis-
charge or refunding of lawful obligations, and the reimburse-
ment of the treasury for moneys actually expended from in-
come.21 Penalties are ordinarily provided for failure to observe
any of the provisions in the act. These penalties operate against
the securities issued, the corporations, and the officers and em-
ployees. The laws of nine states declare all securities void that
15 Texas, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire.
10 Arizona, California, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, New
Hampshire, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin.
17 Arizona, California, and Illinois.
is Arizona, California, Illinois, Missouri, and Wisconsin.
19 Arizona, California, Illinois, and Missouri.
20 In re Turner Light & Power Co., P. U. R. 1916A 418.
21 Cf. Barron, State Regulation of Securities (1918) 76 ANNALS OF Am.
ACADEMY OF POLTICAL & SOCIAL SCIENCE 167, 178-179.
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violate the law.22 Texas,2 California "' and New Hampshire 2
require new applications, but Nebraska 26 and Indiana ' validate
such issues. There is a conflict of authority as to the commis-
sion's authority to take this latter course. The penalty imposed
on the utility is usually a fine ranging from $500 to $20,000. In
some states the agent may also be fined from $500 to $10,000 on
a misdemeanor charge, and in other states he may be imprisoned
for a term of fifteen years on a felony charge. In Texas such
an agent is personally responsible to the creditors for the full
amount of the damage sustained.
The security issues of public service corporations subject to
state control are usually defined as stocks, stock certificates,
bonds, notes, trust certificates, and other evidences of indebted-
ness payable at more than twelve months after date. The
public utility acts, it seems, do not enter into more detail, and this
lack of an adequate definition has been a marked deficiency
characteristic of all the laws. It is also left to the discretion of
the commissions to determine what constitutes an issue of such
securities. .A1 securities issued for periods of less than twelve
months are ordinarily exempt from regulation. The Pennsyl-
vania commission, however, may, at its own discretion, require
a certificate of notification to be filed, while Wisconsin limits
such proposed issues to those made for money; and requires its
consent if issued for property or service. The other states place
no restraint upon the issuance of such securities. The inter-
state character of a corporation or of a particular issue may also
partially lead to exemption. Some state statutes confine regu-
lation to domestic utilities. -1 In such cases the securities of a
foreign utility corporation need not be approved. Other states
have laws which apply to all corporations transacting business
within the state. 9 In Georgia the law is so worded that it could
be interpreted to apply to all such corporations, but the commis-
sion has refused to take jurisdiction over stocks issued by foreign
corporations, or bonds issued by a utility engaged in interstate
commerce.20
22 Arizona, California, District of Columbia, Illinois, Kansas, Blaine, Ohio,
Texas, and Wisconsin.
2
3 Davis v. Watertown Nat. Bank, P. U. R. 1915E 531.
24In re Oakland, A. & E. R. R., P. U. I. 1915A 643; In re Escondido
Utilities Co., Ibid. 1071.
25In re Conway L. & P. Co., P. U. R. 1915E 931.
26Re Application of Firth Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1915C 24.
27 In re Farmers' & BM. Co-op. Telephone Co., P. U. IL 1915B 55.
"8Maine, Maryland, Nebraska, New York, and Vermont.
"9District of Columbia, Kansas, Michigan, New Hampshire, Ohio, and
Wisconsin.
-3 See 25 NAT. Ass'x or RAILRoAD ComIISSIONERS, PuOcEDINGS (1913)
172.
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Frequently, the location of the property used as the basis for
the issue is made the measure of jurisdiction. The acts of Ari-
zona, California and Missouri apply to all issues based upon
property within the state. A: commission ruling of Illinois holds
likewise. Some commissions lose control if the proceeds are
spent without the state. The laws of Massachusetts and New
Hampshire exempt such part of an issue as represents expendi-
tures outside of the state. The Ohio commission grants, but does
not require,' its approval if expenditures are to be made without
the state. The Maryland commission ruled that it had full
jurisdiction over all securities issued by domestic corporations,
but the courts held that it had no control over securities whose
proceeds were spent outside the state.3 1 Aside from these excep-
tions, the laws governing security issues apply to every form of
security issue, including pledge, whether pertaining to new, exist-
ing, reorganized, or consolidated companies, and whether for
property or services.
Presumably, the chief purpose of regulating utility sdcurities
is to avoid the evils of over-capitalization. Regulation, so far
as possible, should aim to establish an equilibrium 'between
capitalization and the bona fide investment. Over-capitalization
increases the financial risk and- accentuates the difficulty of
obtaining capital for new additions and extensions. It may
divert money that should be used for upkeep and renewals to
pay dividends on fictitious stock. Fictitious capital may be used
to conceal what otherwise would be an excessively high rate of,
return. If a company were earning a nominal high rate of
return on a fair capitalization of its plant and equipment, public
opinion probably would demand a lower return; but if the same
corporation shows only a fair or normal rate of return on an
over-capitalized structure, there will be fewer protests, and
criticism of the rate of return might seem to be without valid
foundation.2 In either case the return actually realized may
be the same. Over-capitalization makes securities speculative
and thus fails to attract bona fide investors who, in the last
analysis, furnish the sort of capital demanded by modern large-
scale industry.
In connection with over-capitalization, the question frequently
arises as to what should be done in cases where corporations were
over-capitalized prior to the establishment of commission control
over securities. A number of the commissions have taken a defin-
ite stand in regard to this question. The New York Second
District Commission passed upon this question early in its his-
tory. The commission held that it had absolutely nothing to do
31 Laird v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 121 Md. 179, 88 Atl. 348 (1913).
32 Cf. HOLmES, REGULATION OF RAILROADS AND PUBLIC UTILITIES IN WIS-
CONSIN (1915) 238.
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with the capitalization of the companies which had come into
existence previous to its establishment. It maintained that its
duty was to pass upon applications for new securities, and to
determine whether the new capital to be issued is for purposes
that are right and proper under the law33 The Ohio commission
has similarly dealt with this problem. It has ruled that past
offenses involving over-capitalization ". . should not be re-
garded as a bar to future honest action, although the honest
superstructure may of necessity be compelled to rest upon a dis-
honest foundation." 34 The New Jersey commission has taken
a similar position, ruling that the intent of the public utility
law is to prevent subsequent inflated issues.' It seems that a
majority of the commissions, including those of Indiana, Mary-
land, Nebraska, Michigan, Illinois, New Hampshire, Wisconsin,
California, and Missouri approve new issues of securities re-
gardless of the relation which existed between capitalization
outstanding and the value of the property prior to commission
control. While some commissions have not explicitly committed
themselves on this issue, the position taken by those mentioned
above appears to be generally accepted except in Massachusetts
and Texas. The Massachusetts commission has followed the
practice of refusing to approve new securities when the value
of the property of the companies consolidated is less than the
par value of the stock and funded debt outstanding. In some
instances, this commission has found it necessary to waive this
policy in the interests of the public. In general, however, it has
not permitted further capitalization when over-capitalization al-
ready existed, although the expenditures might be for a legiti-
mate and lawful purpose. The Texas Railroad Commission
has regularly refused to allow new issues of securities, if the
outstanding issues exceeded the value of the property.2r The
rigid application of this policy in Texas has checked somewhat
the building of extensions and investments in betterments by
railroads. In Massachusetts this result has largely been pre-
vented by the fact that the commission has permitted rates to
be charged which have enabled the utilities to build up a surplus
in the property out of earnings.
To require commissions to follow the practice of the Massa-
chusetts commission and squeeze out all the water that has been
33 Watertown Light & Power Co., 1 N. Y. PuB. SmL CoMm., 2D DIST.,
ANNUAL RP. F0R 1908, 11, 12. ,
u OHio PuB. SEE. COMm. REP. (1912) 4.
3 N. J. BOAR OF PuB. UTrL. ComM., Conference Order No. '7, and Con-
ference Ruling No. 13 (June, 1911).
26 TEx. .PR. COMM. REP. (1913) 442. In some instances separate capi-
talization of extensions has been permitted, which has lessened the severity
of this policy.
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injected in the past before new securities may be issued would
impose a great financial hardship upon many corporations. 'Cer-
tain writers 3 also feel that this principle would violate the ele-
mentary theories of American justice, and would establish an
ex post facto practice, compelling, in substance, the elimination
of capitalization the issuance of which was perfectly legal and
countenanced by the states when it was made. While it would
seem that, ordinarily, commissions should not endeavor to ex-
tend their regulatory power into the past, nevertheless past
over-capitalization should not be ignored to the extent of per-
mitting the issuance of additional securities by utility corpora-
tions which are tending toward bankruptcy, and which inevi-
tably must go into the hands of a receiver. To permit this would,
in all probability, inflict a loss upon those who purchase such
securities. This principle has been recognized by the California
commission.38
Consolidation of utility properties was often used to inflate
capitalization before the establishment of government control
over the issuance of public utility securities. It was often felt
that it would be easier for a new corporation to float an excessive
issue than for the separate companies to do so. Stockholders of
merged companies were willing to avail themselves of the op-
portunity of exchanging their shares for larger shares in the
new company. In those states which have undertaken rigidly
to regulate securities, this practice is no longer possible. In
these states capitalization cannot be increased through consoli-
dation beyond that of the consolidated companies. In Ohio,3" for
example, the law provides that the capital stock and aggregate
debt of corporations formed by the consolidation of two or more
corporations shall not exceed the sum of the capital stock and
aggregate funded debt of the merged companies and any addi-
tional sum actually paid in cash. The laws of Maryland,40 Ne-
braska,'41 New York,4 2 Illinois, 43 and Indiana 44 have the same
provisions regarding capital stock, but they do not include the
debt. In those states where statutes do not specifically cover
the subject of capitalization of consolidation, the commissions
have formulated certain principles to which they adhere in pass-
ing upon this phase of financial control.
4
5
3 Heilman, op. cit. supra note 8, at 891.
38 Application of United R. R. of San Francisco, 2 CAL. R. R. CoDIAI.,
OPINIONS AND ORDERS F0R 1913, 140-148.
39 Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1926) § 614-59.
4 Md. Code (Bagby, 1924). Art. 23, §§ 381, 392.
4'Neb. Comp. Stat. (1922) § 676.
42 N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1923) c. 49, §§ 55, 69, 101.
43 Ill. Rev. Stat. (Smith, 1921) c. 111 2/3, § 22.
4 Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns, 1926) § 12763.
45 Cf. Heilman, The Capitalization of Public Utility Consolidations (1917)
7 Aa . ECONOMIC REV. 187.
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The statutes referred to above provide that capital stock, or
the stock and debt, of the new corporation shall not exceed that
of the consolidated companies. While this principle is laudable,
and there is nothing in the act of consolidation which justifies
increasing the aggregate of capitalization, nevertheless it is a
subject of controversy whether this principle goes far enough.
It has frequently been maintained that a corporation which rep-
resents a consolidation of other companies, and which comes into
possession of the propelties of the consolidated companies, should
be treated identically as a new utility is treated, and that the
amount of capitalization authorized should be determined solely
by the actual value of the property to be acquired by the consoli-
dated utility enterprise. The Missouri commission 4 has favored
the principle that over-capitalization must be eliminated before
permission will be given to consolidate. On the other hand the
Arizona, 4 7 Ohio,'4 Maryland, 9 and Kansas 0 comnissions are on
record as approving applications for the issuance of securities
in a consolidation process without ascertaining any valuation
of the properties of the separate companies. This action was
apparently justified by these commisisons on the ground that the
capitalization of the properties involved was not increased by the
consolidation. It is probable, in many cases, that if the capitali-
zation of consolidated enterprises were made to correspond to
the actual value of the propelties included, the consolidation
would not be effected, and the community would be deprived of
the advantages arising from unified operation, such as more
economical financing, lower operating expenses, and more effi-
cient management. Consolidation, especially of smaller utilities,
will often produce gains from which the public may derive the
benefit, if a regulatory body exists with ample powers." To
require a consolidation to limit its capitalization to the actual
value of the constituent propelties would be retroactive, : as it
would in some cases require a corporation to wipe out all its past
over-capitalization before permitting it to issue new securities
for betterments and improvements.
If the states were required to permit a fair return on securi-
ties bearing their stamp of approval, then the whole situation
regarding the capitalization of consolidation projects would be
changed. In that event state authorization of securities would
4M MO. PUB. SER. COBIzi., SECOND ANNUAL REP. (1914) 85.47 Consolidation of El Paso & S. W. R. R., APz. Cotp. CommJ., Fmsr
ANNuAL REP. (1912-13) 825.
48 Application of Miami Light, H., & P. Co. and Piqua Elect. Co., OHIO
PuB. UnTL. Co im. REP. (1913) 106.40 Am. TEL. & TEL. CO., Co,.missiox LEArw No. 10, 600.
5o A.m. TEL. & TEL. Co., CommssixN LEurmi- No. 29 (1914) 7/93.
51 Heilman, op. cit. supra note 45, at 192.
52 Supra page 9.
345
YALE LAW JOURNAL
imply protection in rate making, and the petition of a consolida-
tion to issue its securities would have to be treated exactly as
the petition of a new enterprise. In other words, the amount
of securities that could properly be issued would depend upon
the actual value of the property. Under such circumstances
any insistence upon the equivalence between the capitalization
of a consolidation and the value of the constitutent properties
could not be regarded in any sense as retroactive. However,
since there is a lack of specific judicial determination regarding
the degree of obligation a state assumes when it approves se-
curities, it is reasonable to assume that a state is under no obli-
gation to guarantee to investors any particular rate of return
upon the securities it has permitted to be issued. This is the
position taken by nearly all the commissions,"3 and some public
utility acts actually contain this provision. It would be a dan-
gerous precedent for a state to guarantee investments in utility
securities when it exercises a relatively small degree of control
over the actual administration of corporate affairs. Approval
of securities by a commission simply indicates that they are
issued for purposes properly chargeable to capital account, that
they are issued for purposes and in amounts reasonably neces-
sary, that the corporation has secured assets which bear a proper
relation to the amount of securities issued, and that the com-
pany gives evidence of being able to meet fixed charges upon
bonds and notes. Beyond this it would be hazardous to assume
that a commission's approval of securities constitutes a guaranty
of them. Investments, even though they may be honestly and
prudently made at the time of security approval, are not exempt
from the possibility of subsequent ill fortune and disaster to
which a company may succumb. If such control over securities
carried with it the guarantee by the state of a fair return upon the
securities approved, the burden of future bad fortune would be
imposed upon the consumer in the form of relatively higher
rates. Judicial determination doubtless would greatly simplify,
not only capitalization as it pertains to consolidation, but the
whole problem of regulation of utility securities. Rates, there-
fore, will presumably continue to be based upon the fair value
of the property and not upon the securities approved by the
state or its regulatory agent.5 4
The feeling that capitalization should equal the physical value
of the property has at times led to a protest against capital-
izing working capital, i. e., the fund of ready money and sup-
5 The only commission that has definitely taken the stand of protecting
the securities it has authorized is the Massachusetts Public Service Com-
mission. See Heilman, Two Rate Discussions of Importance (1915) 29 Q.
JOUR. Op ECONOMCS 840.
54 Heihnan, loc. cit. supra note 45.
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plies which a concern must have on hand in addition to its plant
and equipment. The Massachusetts commission usually allows
the issuance of securities for this purpose. The New York
Second District Commission also sanctions such an issuance of
securities. The amount that the commission allows to be capi-
talized in such cases will depend upon the extent of the opera-
tions carried on by the corporation.0 5 The Maryland, Missouri,
New Jersey, and Indiana commissions have likewise recognized
the propriety of providing adequate funds by means of issuing
securities. Working capital is essential to provide for supplies
which must be carried in stock, and to make advances for ma-
terials and wages. Since working capital is a part of the invest-
ment which is necessary to conduct the business, this item should
be recognized as one that is properly subject to capitalization.
The commissions controlling security issues determine not
only the total capitalization to be allowed, but also the proportion
that should be maintained between stocks and bonds, and the
proper amount of each. In Massachusetts, a governing principle
has been established by legislative enactment. The statute pro-
vides that railroads, street railways, and gas and electric utilities
cannot issue bonds in excess of their capital stock.-" The New
York Second District Commission has ruled that the maximum
bond issue which it will approve is determined by the probable
excess of earnings over the necessary expenses of operation, es-
timated on "a conservative basis of practical certainty" based
upon a comparison of similar plants already in operationY1 The
New York First District Commission has followed a similar
practice with the exception that it has authorized the issuance
of stock when it was rather uncertain whether there would be
any net income whatever.5 The New Jersey commission will
not approve bond or note issues unless there is sufficient evidence
that the fixed charges can be regularly met, and that the prin-
ciple can be paid at maturity. When securities are to be issued
by a plant already operating, the past and current earnings
are considered as relevant. If the company is newly projected,
bond or note issues will be approved only for such an amount
as it appears that the company can, with average good manage-
55 Complaint of Trustees of Peeksville v. Peeksville L. & R. R. Co., 1
N. Y. PUB. SE. COMi., 2D DIST., ANNUAL REP. roR 1923, 265, 277, 278;
N. Y. Tel. Co., Investigation of Rates, 1 N. Y. PUB. SErv. C0-i., 2D DiST.,
ANNUAL REP. FOR 1924, 93, 140.
5- Mass. Rev. Laws (1921) c. 159, § 53; c. 160, § 47; c. 161, § 29; c.
164, §13.
57 Application of Rochester, C., E., Trac. Co., 1 N. Y. Pun. Smu. Comi.,
2D DIST., REP. OF DECISIONS (1910) 166, 167, 187 et scq.
58 Petition of Mid-Crosstown Ry., 5 N. Y. PuB. Sm. CoMa., 1sT DIST.,
REP. or DECISIONS (1914) 22 (Case No. 1714).
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ment, meet the fixed charges uponA9 The California commission
condemns the construction of properties entirely from the pro-
ceeds of bond issues,60 and specifies 75 per cent of the total capi-
talization in the form of bonds as the maximum limit for a
sound capitalization.1 In Iowa, Nebraska and Utah the maximum
amount of bonds that can be issued is limited to two-thirds of
the capital stock. In Arkansas, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada,
and Ohio, bonds must not exceed the capital stock, while in cer-
tain other states the total indebtedness cannot exceed the capital
stock.62 Connecticut limits the total indebtedness to the stock
paid in, while Delaware, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Wash-
ington permit bonds to be issued to twice the amount of the stock
paid in.
It is impossible, of course, to make a rule as to the proper
proportion of bonds that is uniformly applicable, due to differ-
ences in conditions. Ordinarily, property should not be con-
structed entirely from the proceeds of bonds, as this practice
leads to insecure bonds, receiverships, a lack of responsibility
on the part of shareholders, and other evils. The principle fol-
lowed by the New York and New Jersey commissions is a safe
and preferable one, in so far as the earnings which are "reason-
ably certain" can be properly estimated. Obviously insecure
investments and foreclosures will be prevented if no bonds are
issued upon which the interest would exceed the amounts rea-
sonably certain to be earned. Commissions should not allow
bonds to be issued in unduly large amounts, since bonds approved
by the state will ordinarily secure a ready sale without careful
investigation on the part of the investors, even though issued
to such an excess as to lead to future receivership. While stock
should not be authorized except for an amount which bears a
proper relation to the value of assets owned or to be acquired,
it is not so important that a commission should insist upon the
same degree of assurance of a return upon stock as upon bonds.
Stockholders knowingly forego the right to claim the definitely
fixed rate of return which bondholders possess in return for the
possibility of receiving a larger rate on their stock.
If the primary purpose in regulating securities is to prevent
stock watering, then it is questionable whether commissions
should permit securities to be sold at less than par, since securi-
ties sold at less than their face value will cause those outstanding
59 N. J. BOARD OF Pun. UTm. Comm., Conference Order No. 728, and Con-
ference Ruling No. 13 (1912-13).
6O CAL. R. R. Com. REP. (1912) 308.
61 Application of Livermore Water & P. Co., 2 CAL. R. R. Comx., OPIN-
IONS AND ORDERS FOR 1913, 618-626 (Decision No. 578).
62 Idaho, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Washington, and
Wyoming.
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to become greater in amount than the sum of capital actually
invested in the enterprise. The policy followed by most com-
missions is to require stocks to sell at par, but to allow bonds
to be sold at a discount. The Wisconsin and Indiana commis-
sions permit bonds to be sold as low as 75. The Massachusetts
commission discourages the sale of bonds at less than par, and
Texas prevents bonds from being sold at less than par. Missouri
has allowed bonds to be sold as low as 70, and Illinois for 73.
The New Jersey commission favors a minimum of 80, but re-
quires stock to be sold at par, or, if stock is exchanged for prop-
erty, the property must have a cash value equal to the par value
of the stock.63 Michigan also favors a minimum of 80. The New
Hampshire law requires stocks, but not bonds, to be sold at par.
The Maine commission has required both stocks and bonds to be
sold at par, especially where a new corporation was involved."
Some commissions regularly authorize the sale of both stocks
and bonds at a discount. The California and Georgia commis-
sions permit this, while Ohio permits the latter to be sold at a
discount.65 Whether securities should be permitted to be sold
at less than par depends somewhat upon the general policies
governing a commission, and, especially, its principles of rate
making. If the amount of securities authorized were taken
as the basis for rates, then it is obvious that securities should not
be sold at a discount. Massachusetts, it appears, has used the
amount of securities as such a basis, and, therefore, her position,
in demanding that securities be sold at no less than par, has been
justified. However, no other commission has used the amount
of securities outstanding as a basis for rate making, and there-
fore the selling of securities at a discount may be justified in
these states. In certain cases it might be highly desirable that a
utility be allowed to sell stock at less than par, for otherwise a
company that would be unable to obtain par for its stocks could
not issue new stock to add to its equipment or to construct ex-
tensions. Perhaps it is also so situated financially that further
bond issues would be unwise or impossible. Such a condition
might tempt a company to borrow funds with which to maintain
dividends to keep the market value of stock from going below
par. Such results have been produced, particularly before the
era of regulation. This does not apply to a new project which
is not over-capitalized, has no securities outstanding, and whose
earnings are not known. If an old established utility cannot ad-
vantageously sell its securities at par, it is probably preferable
for a commission to see to it that they are sold at the best pos-
63 N. J. BoARu or PUB. UTmL. Coni., Conference Order No. 7, and Con-
ference Ruling No. 13 (June, 1911).
64Re Application of the Black Stream Electric Co., P. U. R. 1915C 361.
65 In re Application of the Chardon Waterworks Co., P. U. R. 1915A 554.
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sible price. In that instance the commission can prevent the
issuance of more securities than are reasonably necessary for
a given purpose, and at the same time desirable additions or im-
provements to existing properties will not be prevented.
If bonds are sold at a discount, it is ordinarily desirable that
some plan be evolved which will provide for a proper amortiza-
tion of this discount. Both New York commissions 110 require
that bond discounts shall be charged to a special account and
that annual payments be made to this fund, so that the discount
will be .entirely wiped out by the time of maturity. The Cali-
fornia,6 7 Illinois,68 Maryland,-9 Missouri,7° and New Jersey "
commissions follow a similar practice. Several other commis-
sions, including those of Ohio and Georgia, are on record as mak-
ing no such requirements. It also appears that the Wisconsin
commission does not uniformly require amortization, but this
practice does not seem sound financially. The price of bonds
is determined by such factors as the rate of interest, the life
of the bond, the degree of security, the method of payment, and
privileges, such as the right to convert into stock, given to the
holder. The difference between the face value of the bonds and
their selling price measures the cost to a utility of obtaining
money at a given rate of interest. Discount on bonds, therefore,
represents a portion of the interest payment, and amortization
should be provided for. Bonds of financially sound corporations
normally can be sold at par if the rate is properly adjusted. If it
is fixed so that they sell at less than par, the discount simply
denotes a deferred interest charge whose payment is put off
until the bonds mature. Since this discount is, therefore, in the
nature of interest, it should be converted into an annual interest
charge, as it is when amortized. Objection is frequently made
to the amortization requirement on the ground that it compels
the consumer to pay a higher rate for his service than if no
such sum were annually set aside from earnings. If, however,
the rate of interest paid by the bonds were so adjusted that the
bonds would sell at par, the presumption is that the annual fixed
charges upon the property would be higher than if this were not
done, with the same effect of higher rates to the consumer. Thus
the annual payments to the amortization fund are only payments
to the interest fund in disguised form.
66 Application of Bronx Gas & Elec. Co., 2 N. Y. PuB. SEav. CoMm., REp.
OF DECISIONS, 1ST DIST. (1910) 10, 13; Re North Hempstead Gas Rates,
1 N. Y. PUB. SEP. COMM., 2D DIST., ANNUAL REP. FOR 1924, 256, 258; Free-
port v. Nassau & Suffolk Ltg. Co., Ibid. 265, 268.
67 CAL. R. R. CoiM. REP. (1912-1913) 323, 324.
68 National Tel. & Elec. Co., P. U. R. 1915A 872, 875.
69 BID. PUB. SEE. COMM., UNIFORM SYSTEM OF AccouNTS (June, 1911).
701 Mo. Pun. SER. COMM. REP. (1913) 45-46.
71 In re Hanover Water Co., 6 N. J. PuB. UTI,. COM. REP. (1918) 289.
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The state statutes under ordinary circumstances provide that
securities may be issued to acquire property, but they do not
stipulate that this acquisition must be a net addition to the prop-
erty. In other words, the laws are generally silent concerning
the capitalization of replacements. The Second District Com-
mission of New York has unreservedly condemned the capitaliza-
tion of replacements, holding that the outcome of this type of
financing is bankruptcy. The commission further held that,
if under any circumstances its approval were to be given, the
replaced property should not continue to be carried on the bookm
of the corporation as an asset, and the accounts should be so ad-
justed as to make possible a true showing of the affairs of the
company."- The First District Commission of New York has
refused to allow the capitalization of replacements, but has
ruled that if replacements are superior to the property displaced,
the proper standard by which to determine the amount of capital-
ization is the relative cost of each73 The Ohio " and California 5
commissions have likewise refused to permit the capitalization
of replacements. The New Hampshire commission has implied
that it is not justifiable to permit the capitalization of replace-
ments, since such expenditure is "a normal item of mainten-
ance." 76
It appears obvious that replacements should not be capitalized.
The problem, however, is complicated when adequate deprecia-
tion reserves have not been provided for and there is urgent need
for the replacement of old property. In that case the alternative
is to use the method prescribed by the Second District Commis-
sion of New York outlined above. Under this method a utility
may be permitted to issue new securities to obtain the necessary
funds for replacements, but it must eliminate from the balance
sheet the property to be replaced. Capital liabilities are thus
represented by true assets, which will necessitate a company's
drawing either upon its surplus or its future earnings. If a com-
pany had no surplus, the stockholders apparently would have
to accept lower dividends temporarily. Whether this would be
penalizing present stockholders unduly because of a failure on
the part of the corporation to set aside a proper depreciation
fund before regulation of securities began, is a question which
gives rise to considerable difference of opinion.
72Application of Binghampton Light, H. & P. Co., 1 N. Y. PUm. Sm.
Com., 21) DIST., ANNuAL RrP. FOR 1910, 831.
73 Re N. Y. Rys. Bond Issue, 3 N. Y. PuB. Sme. Coi m., IsT DIsr., Rlm.
OF DECisioNs (1912) 397, 407 (Case No. 1500).
7 Application of Trumbull Pub. Ser. Co., OHIo PuB. UTH.. Comm. Rap.
(1914) 149.
75 2 CAL. R. R. CoIm, OPINIONS AND ORDES Fon 191", 1026.
76 In re Milford Light & Power Co., P. U. R. 1915D 235.
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The treatment of replacements seems to be one of the most
difficult problems confronting commissions. Generally an effort
should be made to prevent capitalization of replacements, but
it may be more advisable in some cases to allow this than to
require the public to be served by rundown and dilapidated
property. Sound finance dictates that whenever the urgency of
the situation renders the capitalization of replacements impera-
tive, the approval should be accompanied by provision for the
eventual reduction of capital liabilities, or the investment of
earnings in net additions to the property, equal in amount to
the replacements capitalized. Where a plant still has many years
of wearing, capitalization of replacements can well be prevented
by the commission's requirement of regularly setting aside sums
for a proper depreciation fund. The problem is most compli-
cated during the early years of commission regulation, when the
depreciation reserve is not adequate to provide for replacement.
It seems that there is no unanimity among the commissions as
to whether the promoter of a public utility enterprise should be
allowed, as a return for his services, some of the securities ap-
proved by the commission. The Massachusetts commission has
not allowed promoter's services to be capitalized. The Maryland
and Ohio commissions also have not permitted anything for pro-
moter's compensation. The New York Second District Com-
mission, however, maintains that a fair allowance of capitaliza-
tion should be properly made for such services. The Georgia,
Indiana, New York First District and Wisconsin commissions
all favor promoter's reward as a proper item for capitalization.
The California commission exhibits a marked stand in favor of
allowing the promoter an adequate and generous reward. This
commission has ruled that payment for promoter's services and
organization expenses "are as necessary to the success of a
public utility and are as properly subjects of capitalization as
the cost of the component parts of the utility's plant . . .
A public authority, in estimating the value of such services,
should be liberal so that men of ability may be attracted to the
development of new utility enterprises where needed for the de-
velopment of the State. . ." 7
It has been maintained that some reward should be permitted
by the public to encourage the exercise of such talent. Undoubt-
edly, in some cases such an allowance is not justified, but the
propriety of an allowance can be ascertained only by studying
the conditions in each case. The amount to be allowed for this
77 Application of Cent. Cal. Gas. Co., 2 CAL. R. R. COMM., OrINIONS AND
ORDERS FOR 1913, 116. For other decisions in which the California com-
-mission specifically allows the capitalization of promotion expenses and
services, see Application of the Cal., Shasta & E. Ry., 2 ibid. 326; Appli.
cation of San Rafael and San Anselmo Valley Ry., 3 ibid. 879.
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purpose should depend upon the difficulty of organizing the pro-
ject, the degree of ability shown, and the time required. While
the amount properly allowable may be more difficult to deter-
mine than some other amounts which commissions must ascer-
tain, nevertheless an estimate should be made of the sum neces-
sary to secure and adequately compensate this type of service.
However, in all cases where such allowance is made, care should
be exercised in not permitting an allowance that is unnecessary
or unduly excessive.78
Usually a financial reorganization is accompanied by an in-
crease in capitalization, but a decrease in funded debt and other
obligations upon which fixed charges must be met. An increased
amount of preferred stock, income bonds, and such other secur-
ity, is substituted for bonds and obligations bearing a fixed in-
terest charge. The laws in some states pertaining to reorganiza-
tion provide that capitalization shall not exceed the value of the
property involved. Most laws simply place recapitalization in
the hands of the commissions by requiring that all securities
issued must be approved by the commission, but ithout giving
specific instructions concerning the policy to be followed in re-
organizations.
Some state. commissions have formulated certain principles
to which they adhere in passing upon securities issued under a
reorganization project. The New York First District Commis-
sion in the Third Avenue Railroad case maintained that in re-
organization, it would be unsound financially for the commission
to authorize the issuance of securities upon which it was im-
probable that returns would be earned." The railroad company
in this case held that the rule of law was established that in reor-
ganization the reorganized company might issue securities equal
in amount to the previous capitalization. The commission in re-
jecting this contention of the company said:
"A necessary corollary of this theory is that capitalization
need have no relation to value. If once a company is started and
its securities carefully issued . . . an equity would be created
which would give any successor company purchasing the prop-
erty at foreclosure a perpetual right to issue stock and bonds
to the same amount regardless of what happens to the property.
The original company might allow the property to decay, it might
declare dividends out of capital, it might abuse every corporate
privilege and lose 90 per cent of the original investment, and yet
the purchasers could reasonably insist that this Commission
should approve the issuance of securities equal in amount to the
stock and bonds issued by the original company. It violates the
sound principle that capitalization should have some direct re-
lation to the value of the property it represents."
78 Cf. Heilman, op. cit. supra note 8, at 904.
792 N. Y. PuB. Sme Co Am., IsT DisT., AxNuL RP. FoR 1909, 42, 54.
80 The company in question appealed from the commission's decision to
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The New York Second District Commission has ruled that in
reorganizations the capitalization should be reduced to corres-
pond to the value of the property included. The commission
maintains that reorganization indicates the presence of over-
capitalization, that, therefore, the purpose of reorganization
should be to reduce capitalization to a proper basis, and that in
recapitalization stock and bonds may be issued only in amount
equal to the fair value of the property,' The Missouri commis-
sion has taken a substantially similar position, while the Cali-
fornia commission has stressed the importance of earnings as
a factor in ascertaining proper capitalization in reorganizations.
The principle developed by the New York First District Com-
mission and applied by other commissions, that capitalization
in reorganizations should be based on the value of property and
earnings, is essentially sound if reasonably applied. Occasionally,
however, objection is raised to a reduction in capitalization on
the ground that injustice is worked upon those who hold the old
securities and who are thus obliged to accept a lesser number, or
a smaller par value of the new securities. Upon this subject the
New York Second District Commission has held that no injustice
is wrought upon the bondholders, since, in any case, they are
protected only by the value of the property pledged as security
for their bonds and by the earning capacity of the property.
Furthermore, a reduction in capitalization is likewise held not
necessarily to cause an injustice to the stockholders, as their
equity in the property does not exceed the difference between
the value of the property and the bonds and other obligations
against it. It is also held that their income cannot exceed the
difference between total earnings and operating expenses and
fixed charges, irrespective of the par value or the number of their
shares. This argument is based on the assumption that a stock-
holder is entitled only to his proper proportion of the dividends,
and to his proper proportion of the proceeds of the sale of the
assets of the corporation if it should be dissolved at any time. Of
course, under some circumstances it is obvious that two shares of
stock of $100 par value each might be sold for more than one
share of $100, although the one represents the same share in
the ownership of the property as the two. This fact is in part
responsible for the tendency toward over-capitalization, and reg-
the Court of Appeals, which decided the case adversely to the ruling of
the commission. This decision was based upon the fact that a section
in the Corporations Act, which gave corporations freedom in the matter
of recapitalization, had not been repealed by the Public Utility Commis-
sion Law. Later this statute was repealed, so that the commission now is
free to follow the policy adhered to in the Third Avenue Case.
81 Petition of Genesee Light & Power Co., 1 N. Y. PUB. SER. Comm., 2D
DIsT., ANNUAL REP. FOR 1919, 228, 578.
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ulation should aim to prevent excessive capitalization which is
likely to result from this fact. If the capitalization of a bank-
rupt company is so great that earnings based upon the fair value
of property are not sufficient to properly provide for interest
and dividends, approval by a commission of the old capitalization
as the proper basis for the new would in reality mean that the
commission would aid security holders in the defunct utility cor-
poration to unload their losses upon the investor. State control
cannot undo all the evils resulting from securities issued excess-
ively prior to the era of regulation, but when capitalization is
so out of proportion to earning capacity and the value of the
property that reorganization is inevitable, the time is opportune
to scale down capitalization.
Mlany state laws allow stock dividends to be issued in an
amount equal to the difference between the actual value of the
assets and present capitalization. The net assets and property
of the company in excess of other liabilities must be equal to
the par value of the total stock outstanding after such stock
dividends have been declared. The commissions of California,c2
Illinois,13 Indiana 8 - and New Jersey r, have rendered opinions
to the same effect. In certain instances the issuance of stock
dividends has some advantages. Surplus is essential to every
corporation for the purpose of providing for emergencies and
stabilizing dividends. An economic waste results if this surplus
is kept in the form of idle cash. If it is placed in outside in-
vestments over which the management has no control, a risk
is incurred which could only be minimized by investing it in
preferred securities yielding small returns. When the surplus
is invested in a company's own business, improvements can be
made regardless of conditions in the money market. With the
present powers possessed by utility commissions, there is little
danger involved in permitting the investment of a corporation's
surplus in its own property and the distribution of a stock divi-
dend when the property improvements are completed. This
would be particularly just in cases where the owners have denied
themselves dividends in order to build up the credit of the cor-
poration.
The courts have established fundamental principles regarding
the valuation of utility property and rate making, but they have
not formulated definite and specific principles vith reference to
control of utility capitalization. In this important field of utility
operation the commissions have worked out well-defined prin-
ciples which are generally followed by them. While some of
82 In re Pacific Gas. & Elect. Co., P. U. R. 1915C 324.
83 In re Mlaroa Mut. Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1915A 205.
8- In re Linton Water Co., P. U. R. 1915A 540.
85 In re Raritan River R. R., P. U. R. 1915E 72.
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these principles may be questioned, yet as a whole they are
beneficial to the public. Regulation of utility securities of the
type discussed in this treatise will in all probability render im-
possible the sort of financial manipulation and jugglery that has
characterized the management of the public utilities in the past.
This scheme of control has not eradicated all the evils hitherto
inherent in utility capitalization, but it has at least minimized
the burden which these evils formerly imposed upon the public,
especially in states where the commissions have ample power
to regulate issues of utility securities. Many of the state laws
controlling security issues lack uniformity, and are still inade-
quate properly to safeguard the investor, but in spite of these
defects it is only fair to say that the attempt at regulation has
been justified and in the main satisfactory.
